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THREE MODELS OF JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: THE EUROPEAN
UNION, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION
Jeffrey Michael Smith
Many opponents of the World Trade Organization (WTO) argue that
America's sovereignty is threatened by the WTO's judicial structure,
which allows international tribunals to rule on claims that laws or
regulations of the United States (or of state or local governments) violate
international agreements. Perhaps the most hyperbolic critic of the WTO
is perennial presidential candidate Patrick J. Buchanan, a former aid to
Presidents Nixon and Reagan and one-time media pundit, who writes: "As
Christianity dies in the west, the foundation and first floor of a new world
government are already in place. The U.N. is to be its parliament ... and
the WTO would be its judicial branch . . . ."' Mr. Buchanan bases this
apocalyptic assertion, in part, on his observation that the European Union
(EU) has eroded the sovereignty of its member governments.2
Indeed, the EU's Commission and European Court of Justice have
effectively influenced and enforced the law of the EU at the price of
significant erosion of the sovereignty of the EU's constituent nations.
While the shift of some amount of sovereignty from European national
governments to the EU appears to have significant support within Europe,
this type of international judicial authority clearly would not be acceptable
to most Americans.
At the other extreme, the United Nations' International Court of
Justice (I.C.J.) has not eroded the sovereignty of national governments,
tAssociate, Williams, & Connolly LLP: J.D., Duke University School of Law; B.S.,
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. The author wishes to thank Deborah J. Katz,
Luba Shur, and Virginia E. Robinson for their helpful comments. The views expressed in
this Article are the author's alone.
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but generally has been ineffective at enforcing international law in cases
concerning important policy issues. The I.C.J. lacks the power to enforce
its decisions.
The imperfectness of the EU and the I.C.J. notwithstanding, a closer
look at the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO shows that it differs
in important ways from the dispute resolution systems of the EU and
United Nations (U.N.). The WTO dispute resolution process has the
potential to be effective in enforcing international treaty obligations, while
at the same time respecting the sovereignty of its member nations. The
WTO is not, as Mr. Buchanan fears, a threat to the sovereignty of the
United States (or, for that matter, part of an unholy replacement for
Christianity).
Part I of this Article looks at the EU and the ways in which its judicial
institutions, particularly the European Court of Justice, have eroded the
sovereignty of national governments. Part II examines the United Nations
and the ineffectiveness of its International Court of Justice in enforcing its
rulings. Finally, Part III examines the World Trade Organization and its
dispute resolution process, and shows why this process can be effective
without eroding national sovereignty.
I. THE EUROPEAN UNION
The principal institutions of the EU3 include: the European
Parliament, the Council of the EU (often known as the Council of
Ministers4), the European Commission, the European Court of Justice, the
European Court of First Instance, and the European Court of Auditors.!
3. The term "European Union" has applied since the Treaty of Maastricht came into
force on November 1, 1993. See TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 191) 1
(1992). From 1967 until 1993, the institution was known as the "European Communities."
See The EU's Constitutional Convention: The Founding Fathers, Maybe, ECONOMIST, Feb.
23, 2002, at 53. The European Communities was formed in 1967 by the unification of the
European Economic Communities and Euratom (both formed in 1958) with the European
Coal and Steel Community (formed in 1952). See id. For simplicity, this Article uses the
terms "European Union" and "EU" to apply to the European Union, the European
Communities, and the European Economic Community.
4. The "Council" is actually two bodies. Meetings of the heads of state or government
(generally, twice a year) constitute the "European Council." Meetings of lower level
ministers constitute the "Council of the European Union." See KLAUS-DIETER
BORCHARDT, THE ABC OF COMMUNITY LAW 31 (5th ed. 1999).
5. The other EU institutions are the European Central Bank, which, similar to the
Federal Reserve Board in the United States, regulates the Union's currency, the Euro; the
European Investment Bank, which administers loans and guarantees to promote
development; and two consultative bodies, the Economic and Social Committee of the
European Communities and the Committee of the Regions of the EU. See id. at 53-56.
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A cursory review of the EU might suggest that the Parliament and Council
are its legislative bodies, the Commission is its executive branch, and the
courts are its judicial component. Closer study shows, however, that the
EU does not neatly divide the legislative, executive, and judicial powers.
In fact, the Council, by far the Union's most powerful institution despite
being hampered by unanimity requirements on many matters, exercises
both executive and legislative powers. The European Commission acts
within the legislative, executive, and judicial spheres. The European
Parliament, although primarily a legislative body, exercises an executive
role. And, while the Courts of Justice and First Instance are judicial
organs, the Court of Auditors is actually another executive institution.
The EU aims to establish "a common market and an economic and
monetary union" and to "implement ... common policies. ''6 The rules and
constitution of the EU are set forth in a series of treaties.7 The most
important of these is the Treaty Establishing the European Community,
formerly known as the Treaty of Rome. This Treaty went into force
between six nations on January 1, 1958,' and has been amended by
numerous subsequent treaties, now binding fifteen nations.9 The most
recent EU treaty to be signed is the Treaty of Nice.'"
6. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, art. 2, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C
340) 3 (1997) [hereinafter EC TREATY].
7. On February 28, 2002, the EU opened a constitutional convention with the goal of
producing a single written constitution for the EU. See T.R. Reid, Europeans Open Talks
on Drafting Constitution, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2002, at A15. The road to such a
constitution will likely be a long one with a large amount of debate: "The Germans will
push for a European federation, with nation-states becoming more like the 16 German
(states] and the institutions in Brussels more like a real European government. The British,
meanwhile, will stick to their old aim of keeping the nation-state supreme and the EU's
institutions restricted to tightly-defined common tasks. France sounds ambiguous,
reflecting old tensions between its desire to build a united Europe and a Gaullist belief in
the nation-state." Europe's Big Three.- An Anglo-German Liaison, ECONOMIST, Mar. 2,
2002, at 48.
8. The original members of what is now called the EU were Belgium, Germany,
France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [TREATY OF ROME], Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S 11.
9. The Union now includes the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark (admitted in
1973); Greece (admitted in 1981); Spain and Portugal (admitted in 1986); and Austria,
Sweden, and Finland (admitted in 1995). See BORCHARDT, supra note 4, at 7.
10. TREATY OF NICE, O.J. (C 80) 50 (2001) [hereinafter TREATY OF NICE].
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A. The EU Institutions
1. The European Council
The EC Treaty, as amended, defines the principal institutions of the
EU. The most powerful institution in the EU is the Council of Ministers."
The Council of Ministers consists of one high-level representative from
each member state's government." The Council Presidency rotates among
the members every six months. 3 The Council is vested with, among other
enumerated powers, the extremely broad "power to take decisions."'"
When the Council meets as heads of state or government, its function is to
"establish policy guidelines" for the EU; when it meets as junior ministers,
its "main task is to lay down and implement legislation."'5
The Council makes decisions and issues Directives in a myriad of
ways, depending on the subject matter at issue. Many matters must be
agreed upon unanimously. 6 Other decisions are taken by majority vote."
Many other decisions are taken by a "qualified majority," under which the
members have weighted votes. s The votes are assigned to members based
somewhat on population. However, smaller countries are heavily over
represented, while larger countries (particularly Germany) are
underrepresented. 9 When the Council is acting on a proposal from the
European Commission, an affirmative vote requires sixty-two of the
20
eighty-seven votes (which will go to 169 of 227 pursuant to the Treaty of
Nice)." When not acting on a Commission proposal, an affirmative vote
still requires sixty-two of the eighty-seven votes (169 of 227 pursuant to the
Treaty of Nice), and the affirmative votes must be cast by ten different
members.2 The Treaty of Nice adds yet another hurdle to decisions
requiring a qualified majority: under it, a member may invoke a
11. See, e.g., Lee Ann Askew, Comment, The EC, the I.C.J, and Intellectual Property:
Is Harmonization the Key?, 7 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 375, 379 (2000) ("the most
powerful institution of the [Union], the Council of Ministers is the final authority on what
becomes EU law.").
12. EC TREATY art. 203.
13. Id.
14, EC TREATY art. 202.
15. BORCHARDT, supra note 4, at 31, 40.
16. EC TREATY art. 202.
17. EC TREATY art. 205, para. 1.
18. EC TREATY art. 205, para. 2.
19. See infra Table 1.
20. EC TREATY art. 295, para. 3.
21. TREATY OFNICE Protocol A, art. 3, para. 1.
22. EC TREATY art. 205, para. 2.
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requirement that the members voting in favor of the decision represent
62% of the total population of the EU.23 With this requirement, obtaining
a "qualified majority" requires three supermajorities: 1) a supermajority of
Council votes; 2) a supermajority of members (except when acting on a
Commission recommendation); and 3) a supermajority of population. See
Table 1.
2. The European Parliament
The European Parliament is the one EU institution that is chosen
directly by the European people.24 However, the European Parliament is
also the least powerful of the major EU institutions: "[T]he [European]
parliament is that rare beast, a legislature that cannot actually initiate
,25legislation."
The European Parliament currently consists of 626 seats, allocated
2627
amongst the fifteen EU members, and it has seventeen committees.
Like the votes in the Council, the allocation of seats in the Parliament
over-represents smaller countries and under-represents larger ones. 2 The
Parliament, however, more closely represents the various populations of
the member states." Members of the European Parliament serve five-year
terms. 3°
As noted, the European Parliament cannot initiate legislation. It can
only request the European Commission to submit "any appropriate
proposal."" For certain acts, the European Parliament does have a true
legislative role. Acts subject to Article 2513' of the EC Treaty are
proposed by the Commission, but must be approved, either in original
23. TREATY OF NICE, Protocol A, art. 3, para. 1(a)(ii) ("If that condition is shown not to
have been met, the decision in question shall not be adopted.").
24. EC TREATY art. 190, para. 1.
25. Charlemagne: Europe's Forgotten President, ECONOMIST, Jan. 12, 2002, at 49; see also
BORCHARDT, supra note 4, at 33 ("The European Parliament possesses only a few of the
functions of a true parliament in a parliamentary democracy.").
26. See infra Table 2.
27. BORCHARDT, supra note 4, at 35.
2& See infra Table 2.
29. Compare Table 1 with Table 2.
30. EC TREATY art. 190, para. 3.
31. EC TREATY art. 192.
32. Acts subject to Article 251 include directives to enforce the right of establishment of
citizens of one member state in another member state, including directives relating to
mutual recognition of diplomas and other formal qualifications; directives implementing
the EU's common transport policy; and measures taken to strengthen customs cooperation
between members. EC TREATY art. 44, para. 1; EC TREATY art. 47, para. 1; EC TREATY,
art. 71, para. 2; EC TREATY art. 135.
20021
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form or with jointly agreed amendments, by both the European Council
and the European Parliament.33  For acts subject to Article 252,34 the
Parliament's role is essentially advisory." The Parliament also serves
executive functions, approving the appointment of the European
Commission members,3" exercising oversight of the Commission, and, if it
deems necessary, voting (by two-thirds) to dismiss the entire
Commission.38 See Table 2.
3. The European Commission
The European Commission currently consists of twenty members.39
The Commission must have at least one member from each member
country and no more than two members may be from the same country.•4
In practice, the Commission consists of two members from each of the
larger EU nations-France, Ireland, Germany, Spain, and the United
Kingdom-and one member from each of the smaller ten-member
nations.41 Pursuant to the Treaty of Nice, European expansion could
increase the size of the Commission to as many as twenty-six.
4 2
Members of the Commission are appointed by "common accord" of
the Member States for five-year terms, subject to approval by the
European Parliament.4 '3 The Commission is headed by a President under
whose "political guidance," the Commission works.44
The Commission performs a legislative role; its submission is often
mandatory for an act to be passed validly by the Council and/or the
Parliament. The Commission also performs numerous executive
33. EC TREATY art. 251. To be precise, the European Parliament only has to refrain
from disapproving an act for it to pass. If the Parliament takes no action within three
months, it is deemed to have approved the act. Id.
34. Acts subject to Article 252 include acts relating to the non-assumption of obligations
of one member state by another member state and acts relating to the common currency.
See EC TREATY art. 106, para. 2; EC TREATY art, 103, para. 2.
35. See EC TREATY art. 252.
36. EC TREATY art. 214, para. 2.
37. EC TREATY arts. 192-193, 195, 200-201.
38. EC TREATY art. 201. Indeed, in 1999, the Parliament forced the resignation of the
entire Commission. See Robert MacPherson, EU Aims To Change Eurocrats' Pay,
Promotion System, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Feb. 28, 2001.
39. EC TREATY art. 213, para. 1.
40. Id.
41. BORCHARDT, supra note 4, at 44.
42. TREATY OF NICE art. 4.
43. EC TREATY art. 214.
44. EC TREATY art. 219.
45. See EC TREATY arts. 251-252.
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functions, essentially serving as the EU's day-to-day government, albeit
under the overall direction of the Council. In addition, as described below,
the Commission also performs a judicial role.
4. The European Courts
The European Court of Justice consists of fifteen judges, one from
each member nation.46 Officially, all fifteen members are appointed "by
common accord of the governments of the Member States. ''47 However,
"in practice each Member State proposes a candidate of its own
nationality."" Judges of the ECJ serve six-year terms and can be
reappointed.49
The ECJ is empowered to interpret EU law in cases and advisory
opinions. The ECJ has jurisdiction over cases brought by the European
Commission against a member nation alleging a failure to fulfill Treaty
obligations, as well as over cases brought by one member state against
another (although such cases must first be brought before the
Commission). ° The ECJ also has jurisdiction to review the legality of acts
of the Council, Parliament, Commission, and European Central Bank.5
Finally, the ECJ can give opinions to national courts when asked to give a
preliminary ruling about the interpretation of the EC Treaty, the validity
of EU acts, or the interpretation of acts of the Council." When a question
falling in one of these categories is before a national court of last resort,
that court is required to bring the matter before the ECJ.53
The European Court of First Instance is an "[attachment]" to the
ECJ, whose principal role is to serve as a fact-finding court.4 The Court of
First Instance has jurisdiction "at first instance" over many cases ultimately
within the jurisdiction of the ECJ.5' As the court's name suggests, its
decisions are subject to appeal to the ECJ, although only on points of law,
and not on issues of fact."
46. EC TREATY art. 221.
47. EC TREATY art. 223.
48. Christopher Henkel, Constitutionalism of the European Union: Judicial Legislation
and Political Decision-Making by the European Court of Justice, 19 Wisc. INT'L L.J. 153,
156 (2001).
49. EC TREATY art. 223.
50. EC TREATY arts. 226-27.
51. ECTREATY art. 230.
52. EC TREATY art. 234.
53. Id.
54. ECTREATY art. 225, para. 1.
55. Id.
56. See id.
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The European Court of Auditors is not really a court at all. Rather, it
is essentially an independent executive agency. The Court of Auditors
consists of fifteen members, appointed for six-year terms by the member
nations." The Court of Auditors' duties include independently examining
all accounts of revenue and expenditure by the EU and reporting the
results of its examinations to the other EU institutions. 8
B. The Judicial Role of EU Institutions
1. The European Commission
As noted above, when EU member nations have disputes regarding
the EC Treaty, they are required first to take their disputes before the
European Commission." Additionally, the Commission plays a judicial
role with regard to private individuals and companies both inside and
outside of the EU.
When studying the effect and influence of the European Commission,
one is immediately drawn to the Commissioner for Competition, who has
been described as "the most powerful man in Europe." 6 Best known by
many Americans for blocking the proposed merger between General
Electric and Honeywell, 6  a regulatory action, the Competition
Commissioner also exercises judicial power.
Recent fines imposed on the world's major vitamin manufacturers
illustrate the judicial power of the Commission. Beginning approximately
1998, the United States Department of Justice began investigating a
decade-long price-fixing conspiracy in which the world's major vitamins
manufacturers fixed production quantities, allocated customers, and set
prices for numerous vitamins throughout the world. The U.S. Justice
Department, however, is purely an executive department, and after
investigating the vitamins conspiracy, the Department was required to go
to court to seek fines from the participants. The Justice Department
brought thirteen court cases against vitamins manufacturers." These cases
57. EC TREATY art. 247.
58. EC TREATY art. 248.
59. EC TREATY art. 227.
60. Europe's Fearless Diplomat. Mario Monti, ECONOMIST, July 7, 2001, at 63 (quoting a
comment from former Competition Commissioner Karel Van Miert to current Competition
Commissioner Mario Monti).
61. European Commission Blocks GE/Honeywell Merger, AVIATION DAILY, July 5,
2001, at 3.
62. Press Release, Department of Justice, Three Japanese Companies Agree To Plead
Guilty Pay Criminal Fines, for Participating in International Vitamin Cartel (Sept. 9, 1999),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/1999/3659.htm [hereinafter Press
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led to guilty pleas and fines totaling more than $850 million, but these fines
required court approval.63
By contrast, the European Commission acted on its own, issuing a
detailed 124-page decision signed by Competition Commissioner Mario
Monti, with extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law. In its
decision, the Commission unilaterally imposed substantial fines on various
vitamin manufacturers. 6' The vitamin fines, totaling approximately 860
million euros, are the largest the Commission has levied on a single
industry and form a large part of the 1.8 billion euros in fines assessed by
the Commission for price fixing since 1994.6' These fines are appealable,
but only in a EU court, not in any national court. Thus, the EU's role in
adjudicating antitrust cases puts it on a level with the United States
government (in this area), making the EU more like a government and less
a typical international organization.
2. The European Court of Justice
Given the European Court of Justice's broad jurisdiction and vague
mandate, it should come as no surprise that the ECJ has had a dramatic
66
effect on the law in the EU and its constituent states. Moreover, it is not
surprising that the ECJ has tended to strengthen the power of EU law at
the expense of national law.67 For example, the ECJ has repeatedly
stressed the supremacy of EU law over national law.68 This repeated
69holding has been accepted by courts in the EU's member states.
Release Dep't of Justice]; see also, e.g., United States v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., Crim.
No. 3:99-CR-184-R (N.D. Tex. information filed May 20, 1999); United States v. BASF
Aktiengesellschaft, Crim. No. 3:99-CR-200-R (N.D. Tex. information filed May 20, 1999);
United States v. Takeda Chemical Indus. Ltd., Crim. No. 3:99-CR-333-R (N.D. Tex.
information filed Sept. 9, 1999); United States v. Lonza, AG, Crim. No. 3:98-CR-338-R
(N.D. Tex. information filed Sept. 30, 1998).
63. Press Release Dep't of Justice, supra note 62.
64. See Commission Decision of 21.11.2001, Case No. COMP/E-1/37.512 - Vitamins, at
117 (Nov. 21, 2001).
65. See Cartels: Fixing for a Fight, ECONOMIST, Apr. 20, 2002, at 63.
66. As one commentator has observed: "[T]he expansion of judicial review by the
European Court of Justice remains the driving force behind the development of
constitutionalism of the European Union. In fact, the European Court of Justice and its
case law play the most dominant and consistent role in the integration process." Henkel,
supra note 48, at 154.
67. See id. (observing that "the Court of Justice indicates a bias toward deeper European
integration and centralized governance.").
68. See, e.g., Case C-213/89, The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte
Factortame Ltd., para. 20, 1990 E.C.R. 1-2433, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 1 (1990) ("The Court has
also held that any provision of a national legal system and any legislative, administrative or
judicial practice which might impair the effectiveness of Community law by withholding
2002]
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The ECJ's dramatic effect on the sovereignty of EU member nations
is most apparent, however, not in the ECJ's broad statement of principles,
but in a line of cases in which the ECJ has, at the behest of private
individuals, both struck down national laws and punished national
governments for either action or inaction, when the ECJ has found
national action or inaction to be inconsistent with the EC Treaty or even
with Community "principles" that the ECJ has divined.
The EC Treaty and the other treaties of the EU, like all treaties, are
agreements between nations. The ECJ, however, has long held that
individuals and corporations have the right to challenge the validity of
national government actions that they perceive as inconsistent with EU
law. In the 1963 case of NV Algemene Transport - en Expeditie
Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue
Administration,7° the ECJ rejected the contention of Belgium and the
Netherlands that the ECJ could not entertain the plaintiff company's
claims that certain customs duties violated the EC Treaty." The ECJ held
that the EC Treaty granted rights to individuals to enforce the Treaty's
obligations on member nations: "[T]his Treaty is more than an agreement
which merely creates mutual obligations between the contracting states
.... [T]he [European] Community constitutes a new legal order of
international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their
sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which
,,2
comprise not only member states but also their nationals." While the
from the national court having jurisdiction to apply such law the power to do everything
necessary at the moment of its application to set aside national legislative provisions which
might prevent, even temporarily, Community rules from having full force and effect are
incompatible with those requirements, which are the very essence of Community law.");
Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA, 1978 E.C.R.
629, para. 18 (1978) (holding "that national legislative measures which encroach upon the
field within which the Community exercises its legislative power or which are otherwise
incompatible with the provisions of Community law" have no legal effect); Case 11-70,
Internationale Handelsgellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, para. 3 (1970) ("the
law stemming from the Treaty [of Rome], an independent source of law, cannot because of
its very nature be overridden by rules of national law.").
69. Hans Smit, The Relative Role of the European Union (EU) Nation States Vis a Vis the
EU Compared to the Roles of States/Provinces in the U.S./Canada Vis a Vis Federal
Government, 27 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 63, 64 (2001) ("In the course of time, the member states'
courts acquiesced in this assertion of judicial supremacy [by the ECJ].").
70. Case 26-62, NV Algemene Transport - en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos
v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, 1963 E.C.J. 1.
71. See EC TREATY art. 25 ("Custom duties on imports and exports and charges having
equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States."). At the time of the van
Gend & Loos case, this provision was in Article 12 of the Treaty.
72. van Gend & Loos, 1963 E.C.J. at II.B (emphasis added).
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court stopped short of striking down the customs provision at issue (it
remanded the case to the national court for additional factual findings),
the ruling established the ECJ's power to review the validity of national
laws objected to by private citizens.
A few years later, the ECJ expanded its mandate, ruling that it could,
again at the behest of an individual plaintiff, strike down national laws that
violate individual rights emanating from a directive of the European
Council. In van Duyn v. Home Office,73 Yvonne van Duyn, a citizen of the
Netherlands, challenged the United Kingdom's decision to prevent her
from entering Britain to work for the Church of Scientology. Ms. van
Duyn relied upon a 1964 Council Directive that stated that where a
member nation excluded the citizen of another member nation on the basis
of public policy or public security, such decision must be based "on the
personal conduct of the individual concerned."74 The ECJ held that an
individual could assert rights based on such a directive. Broadening the
scope of its holding, the ECJ empowered itself to determine what
constituted a proper "public policy" for regulating the entry of one of EU's
nationals into another EU member state: "[i]t should be emphasized that
the concept of public policy in the context of the Community... must be
interpreted strictly, so that its scope cannot be determined unilaterally by
each member state...."75 After accepting Ms. van Duyn's arguments to
the extent that they aggrandized the ECJ's power, the court nevertheless
ruled that the Church of Scientology could legitimately be considered
"socially harmful," and, thus, the United Kingdom could permissibly keep
Ms. van Duyn out.76
Two years later, the ECJ ruled that not only did it have the power to
strike down national laws that it found to be inconsistent with the
European Treaties or Council Directives, it also had the power to enact
laws where national governments had failed to do so in derogation of their
obligations under Community law. In Defrenne v. Societe Anonyme Belge
de Navigation Aerienne Sabena,77 Gabrielle Defrenne complained that
from 1963 to 1966, when she worked as an "air hostess," she had been paid
less than male "cabin stewards" for the same work. Her former employer,
the airline Sabena, pointed out that Belgium, the home country of the
parties, had not outlawed gender discrimination in pay until 1967. The
73. Case 41-74, van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337.
74. Council Directive 64/221, art- 3(1), 1964 O.J. (P 56) 850.
75. van Duyn, 1974 E.C.R. 1337, para 18.
76. See id. para. 24.
77. Case 43-75, Defrenne v. Societe Anonyme Beige de Navigation Aerienne Sabena, 1976
E.C.R. 455.
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ECJ, however, ruled that, pursuant to its treaty obligations, Belgium
should have outlawed gender discrimination in pay. Indeed, Article 141 of
the EC Treaty (which at that time was Article 119) provides that "[elach
Member State shall ensure that the principle of equal pay for male and
female workers for equal work or work of equal value is applied.""8
The ECJ noted that this provision "impose[d] on states a duty to bring
about a specific result to be mandatorily achieved within a fixed period.,
79
And, where Belgium had been derelict (or at least untimely) in its duty,
the ECJ would retroactively provide for Belgium law that would comply
with Belgium's obligation. Thus, Sabena was liable for violating the law
that Belgium should have enacted but had not. In addition to taking upon
itself the task of retroactively legislating for Belgium, the court also took a
shot at the EU's political institutions, asserting that they "ha[d] not reacted
sufficiently energetically against [Belgium's] failure to act.'8°
In Becker v. Finanzamt Munster Onnenstadt,"' the ECJ applied the
Defrenne reasoning, under which the court could alter national law to fit
treaty obligations, to implement a directive of the European Council. In
Becker, Germany was a year late in implementing tax changes required by
a Council Directive. The court held that the plaintiff could take advantage
of the tax law that Germany should have passed. The ECJ held broadly:
[Wjherever the provisions of a directive appear.., to be unconditional
and sufficiently precise, those provisions may, in the absence of
implementing measures adopted within the proscribed period, be relied
upon as against any national provision which is incompatible with the
directive or in so far as the provisions define rights which individuals are
82
able to assert against the state .
In Francovich v. Italian Republic,8 3 the ECJ took the next step in
elevating itself and EU law above national law, holding that an individual
can collect financial reparations from a nation that failed to meet an
outcome required by a European Directive, even if the Directive gave the
national governments broad discretion. Francovich arose pursuant to a
European Directive that required, among other things, member states to
ensure that when an employer became insolvent, its employees would
nevertheless be guaranteed payment of wages earned.84 The directive did
78. EC TREATY art. 141.
79. Defrenne, 1976 E.C.R. 455, para. 32.
80. Id. para. 33.
81. Case 8/81, Becker v. Finanzamt Munster Onnenstadt, 1982 E.C.R. 53.
82. Id. para. 25.
83. Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357.
84. See id. para. 3.
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not specify how the nations were to fulfill this guarantee. Presumably, a
state could guarantee the wages itself, require employers to segregate
some amount of money to pay such claims, or require employers to carry
insurance to cover such claims." In any case, it is clear that states had
broad discretion in implementing the guarantee and were not required to
fund the guarantee from taxpayer revenues. Moreover, under the
Directive, a state had the option to limit both the monetary amount of
wages guaranteed and the number of months' wages guaranteed.86 Finally,
a state had the power "to take the measures necessary to avoid abuses and
in particular to refuse or reduce liability in certain circumstances.""7
Despite the "broad discretion" granted by this directive, Italy did not
implement any effective method of ensuring workers could collect wages
from an insolvent employer. As a result, when thirty-five workers'
employers became insolvent, they were unable to obtain wages that were
owed to them.
The ECJ held that the plaintiffs could not enforce the Directive
directly against Italy because the Directive did not require a state to pay
unpaid wages; it only required the state ensure payment by "an
appropriate institutional guarantee system."89 Thus, the Directive was not
sufficiently precise to enforce directly against a member state. However,
the court ruled that Italy was nevertheless obligated to pay plaintiffs the
owed wages on the grounds that Italy had failed its obligation under the
Directive and thus must be liable for damages caused by its omission.
How this differs from enforcing the Directive against Italy is not
immediately clear. In any case, the ECJ decided that the Italian Republic
must pay wages owed to the plaintiffs by their insolvent employers.
In reaching this decision, the court recalled its long decisional history
that had, step-by-step, eroded the sovereignty of national governments in
the name of EU law:
It should be borne in mind at the outset that the EEC Treaty has
created its own legal system, which is integrated into the legal systems of
the Member States and which their courts are bound to apply. The
subjects of that legal system are not only the Member States but also
85. Id. para. 23.
86. Id. para. 16 ("Depending on the choice it makes, the Member State has the
option... to restrict liability to periods of three months or eight weeks landi may set a
ceiling on liability, in order to avoid the payment of sums going beyond the social objective
of the directive.").
87. Id.
88. Id. para. 25.
89. Francovich, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357, paras. 25-26.
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their nationals. Just as it imposes burdens on individuals, Community
law is also intended to give rise to rights which become part of their
legal patrimony. Those rights arise not only where they are expressly
granted by the Treaty but also by virtue of obligations which the Treaty
imposes in a clearly defined manner both on individuals and on the
Member States and the Community institutions.
Furthermore, it has been consistently held that the national courts
whose task it is to apply the provisions of Community law in areas
within their jurisdiction must ensure that those rules take full effect and
must protect the rights which they confer on individuals.
The full effectiveness of Community rules would be impaired and the
protection of the rights which they grant would be weakened if
individuals were unable to obtain redress when their rights are infringed
by a breach of Community law for which a Member State can be held
responsible.
It follows that the principle whereby a State must be liable for loss
and damage caused to individuals as a result of breaches of Community
law for which the State can be held responsible is inherent in the system
of the Treaty.9O
Thus, as the ECJ reviewed, national sovereignty is circumscribed
because (1) the EU nations are bound to a super-national "legal system" in
which their own courts are bound to apply international law as interpreted
by the ECJ; (2) the rules of the super-national legal system can be directly
enforced by individuals against national governments; (3) the rules that
can be enforced by these individuals include more than just the individual
rights that are expressly granted by the Treaty, encompassing "obligations"
on entities including national governments; (4) national courts must
enforce EU law even in the face of contradictory national law; and
(5) national governments are liable for money damages when they act
outside of what the ECJ determines to be their proper discretion under
EU law.
After Francovich, the ECJ had chipped away at national sovereignty
in every conceivable way, except one. Through Francovich, the ECJ had
limited its overruling of national governments to instances where
governmental action or inaction was inconsistent with the text of EU
treaties or European Directives. Thus, at least a state could feel confident
that it would only be overruled based upon text that its government had
90. Id. paras. 31-33, 35 (citations omitted).
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agreed to, either by treaty or by Council Directive. Five years later,
however, the ECJ passed this final barrier.
In Brasserie du Pecheur SA v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland,9 the
court joined two cases seeking damages from national governments. In the
first case, a French company sued Germany for damages suffered because
of a German law that had regulated the purity of beer until 1987. The
second case involved a group of plaintiffs led by Factorame Ltd. seeking
damages from the United Kingdom for injury suffered from British rules
that were in effect from April through November of 1989, and which
limited plaintiffs' rights to fish in British waters. Factorame and the other
plaintiffs suing the U.K. also sought exemplary damages.
In both cases, the initial laws at issue-the German beer law and the
British fishing law-had previously been struck down by the ECJ in cases
brought by the European Commission.92 The ECJ had held that the
German law violated the provision in the EC Treaty that prohibits
"[q]uantitative restrictions on imports [from other member states] and all
measures having equivalent effect., 93 Given the breadth and vagueness of
this provision (not to mention the equally vague exception in a subsequent
paragraph of the Treaty),94 it seems clear that reasonable minds could
differ on the validity of a beer purity law. Thus, while one could hardly
state that the ECJ was clearly wrong in invalidating the law, one likewise
could hardly accuse Germany of acting in bad faith. The British law was
challenged on the basis of several broad provisions of the EC Treaty,
including a provision stating that "[t]he internal market [of the EU] shall
comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of
goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the
provisions of this Treaty"95 and one stating that "Member States shall
accord nationals of the other Member States the same treatment as their
own nationals as regards participation in the capital of companies.
96
91. Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, Brasserie du Pecheur SA v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland,
1996 ECR 1-1029.
92. Case 178/84, Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1987 E.C.R. 1227
(striking down German beer purity requirement (Reinheitsgebot)); Case 246/89,
Commission v. United Kingdom, 1989 E.C.R. 3125 (holding that nationality requirements
in British fishing law were in violation of EU law).
93. EC TREATY, art. 28 (formerly art. 30).
94. See EC TREATY art. 30 ("The provisions of Article 28... shall not preclude
prohibitions or restrictions on imports... justified on grounds of public morality, public
policy or public security.. ").
95. EC TREATY art. 14 (formerly art. 7).
96. EC TREATY art. 294 (formerly art. 221).
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The issue in Brasserie was whether the plaintiffs could seek monetary
damages from national governments for damages suffered prior to the ECJ
rulings striking down the laws. This presented a different scenario from
the ECJ's earlier cases. Rather than failing a clear obligation either by
action or inaction as national governments had in certain earlier cases,
here Germany and the U.K. had passed laws in good faith that had turned
out to be violative of EU law as interpreted by the ECJ. After the adverse
rulings, the nations had stopped enforcing the laws in question.
The relief that the plaintiffs sought in Brasserie was clearly not
contemplated by the text of the EU Treaties. Indeed, Germany objected
to the recognition of a general right to reparations, arguing that "for such a
right to be recognized by judicial decision would be incompatible with the
allocation of powers as between the Community institutions and the
Member States and with the institutional balance established by the
Treaty." 97 This argument did not stop the ECJ from recognizing such a
right, for while the court conceded that "the Treaty contains no provision
explicitly and specifically governing the consequences of breaches of
Community law by Member States," the ECJ could craft those
"consequences". "by reference to the fundamental principles of the
Community legal system and, where necessary, general principles common
to the legal systems of the Member States."98
The consequences of this statement are dramatic. The ECJ held that
where EU textual law (e.g., treaties and directives) is silent on a subject,
the ECJ can decide what the EU law on that subject is. Moreover, the
ECJ does this by looking not only to broad "fundamental principles of the
Community legal system," but also to "general principles common to the
legal systems of the Member States." By holding that principles of
national law could be applied by an international court to national
governments, the ECJ effectively grants itself the status of a national (or
super-national) court, relegating the sovereign nations of the EU to the
status of mere provinces.9  Furthermore, by stating that it is to be guided
by broad principles of the EU and/or equally broad principles of national
law, the ECJ grants itself near infinite license to choose outcomes as it will,
97. EC TREATY art. 24.
98. EC TREATY art. 27.
99. The ECJ's self-established grandeur is shown by its justification of its own aggressive
"interpretation" of EU law: "In any event, in many national legal systems the essentials of
the legal rules governing State liability have been developed by the courts." EC TREATY
art. 30. Again, the court is placing itself in the role of a national court whose role includes
providing a check against co-equal branches of government, rather than its proper role of
international court whose role is to interpret treaties to settle disputes between sovereign
nations who have agreed to certain explicit terms.
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fitting them into whichever of the many European and national general
principles that suits the ECJ's purpose.'00 This ruling is remarkable
because it binds national governments to an ever evolving European law
that is additional to, and different from, the texts to which the member
nations agreed.
There is no question that the ECJ has eroded the sovereignty of the
EU's member nations. The line of cases in which the ECJ allowed broader
and broader rights to individuals to sue nations based on acts (or
omissions) of governing leads to, by design and effect, a diminution in
national sovereignty. As the ECJ itself has stated, "[t]he purpose of that
right [of individuals to sue on provisions on European law] is to ensure
that provisions of Community law prevail over national provisions."' 0'
This line of cases is not the only one that diminishes national sovereignty.
Sovereignty is also diminished in a series of cases in which the European
Commission has brought suit against national governments.)°
Given the effect that the ECJ has had on the role, power, and
sovereignty of EU nations, it is perhaps understandable that some might
be wary of submitting the United States to a treaty-based international
dispute resolution system such as that of the WTO. However, not all
international courts necessarily have the power and discretion of the ECJ.
II. THE UNITED NATIONS
An international organization that has had much less of an effect on
the sovereignty of its members is the United Nations. However, this lesser
effect is based more upon the U.N.'s ineffectiveness at enforcing judicial
judgments than on any inherent respect for sovereignty.
100. Indeed, Brasserie, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1029, itself presents an example of this. The law of
Germany (one of the parties to the case and one of the member states whose "general
principles" the ECJ claims it will look to) provides that, where a law passed by a German
state is in violation of a federal law of Germany, and is therefore invalid, an individual can
only win reparation from the state if he can show that the legislature's act or omission was
referable to his own situation. Id. The ECJ declined to adopt this principle, ruling that a
German court must not apply such a rule when judging the liability of the Federal Republic
of Germany for a law that violated EU law. Id. In doing so, the ECJ effectively held that,
in least in this respect, Germany's position vis-A-vis the EU was actually lower than a
German state's position vis-A-vis Germany. Id.
101. Id. para. 20.
102. See, e.g., Case C-473/93, Commission v. Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, 1996 E.C.R. I-
3207 (holding that Luxemburg had to allow non-nationals to work in positions within the
government of Luxemburg).
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The United Nations was formed on June 26, 1945, in San Francisco, in
the closing days of World War II, in order "[t]o maintain international
peace and security."'' 3 Needless to say, it has not always been successful.
A. The United Nations Political Institutions
The principal political entities of the United Nations are the General
Assembly, the Security Council, and the Secretary-General1
1. The General Assembly
The General Assembly consists of all members of the United
Nations.' 5 The General Assembly is little more than a glorified debating
society, having little real power. Its enumerated powers include the ability
to "discuss" important international questions and matters;'06 the right to
"consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of
international peace and security;"'' 7 the power to "make
recommendations" to countries or to the Security Council; i08 the right to
"call the attention of the Security Council" to situations threatening peace
and security; 1 9 and the power to "initiate studies" relating to certain
matters."0 And, even these speech and debate powers are limited. The
General Assembly is not permitted, absent specific permission from the
Security Council, to make any recommendations relating to any dispute or
situation that is then before the Security Council."' The General
Assembly's substantive powers consist of the power to accept the Security
Council's nomination for Secretary-General,"2 and the power to approve
the U.N. budget and apportion the expenses among members."' When the
General Assembly makes decisions on "important questions," it must act
by two-thirds majority vote.1
103. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.
104. U.N. CHARTER art. 7, para. 1.
105. U.N. CHARTER art. 9, para. 1.
106. U.N. CHARTER art. 10; U.N. CHARTER art. 11, para. 2.
107. U.N. CHARTER art. 11, para. 1.
108. Id.
109. U.N. CHARTER art. 11, para. 4.
110. U.N. CHARTER art. 13, para. 1.
111. U.N. CHARTER art. 12, para. 1.
112. U.N. CHARTER art. 97.
113. U.N. CHARTER art. 17.
114. U.N. CHARTER art. 18, para. 2.
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2. The Security Council
The real political power in the United Nations resides with the fifteen-
member Security Council. While the U.N. is ostensibly "based on the
principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members,' 15 the makeup of its
most powerful component is based decidedly upon inequality between the
members. The five World War II victors-the United States, the Soviet
Union, China, France, and the United Kingdom-obtained permanent
seats on the Security Council.I" When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991,
its Council seat devolved to Russia; and the Chinese seat has moved
from the Republic of China (better known as Taiwan) to the People'sr - 118
Republic of China; but the five permanent seats remain. The ten non-
permanent seats are chosen by the General Assembly from amongst the
other 185 members of the U.N. 19 Non-permanent members serve two-
year terms and cannot be immediately re-elected'
The Security Council is vested with "primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security.' 12' To carry out this
serious responsibility, the Council is empowered to determine the
112
existence of any threat to, or breach of, the peace, to decide what non-
military measures (including trade sanctions, interruption of
communications, and severance of diplomatic relations) "are to be
123
employed" by U.N. members, and to take such military action "as may
be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security."' 24
Despite its vast enumerated powers, the Security Council's effectiveness is
115. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1 (emphasis added).
116. U.N. CHARTER art. 23, para. 1.
117. Christopher Bellamy, Where Is Putin's Russia Going - and Does It Really Matter?,
SCOTSMAN, Apr. 18, 2000, at 17.
118. G.A. Res 2758, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/8429
(1971).
119. U.N. CHARTER, art. 23, para. 1.
120. Id.
121. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para. 1.
122. U.N. CHARTER art 39.
123. U.N. CHARTER art. 41.
124. U.N. CHARTER art. 42. Of course, neither the Security Council nor the U.N. has a
military capable of taking such action. As a result, action pursuant to Article 42 is generally
a sanction for an American-led military campaign. See SCOR Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th
Sess., at 27, U.N. Doc. S/INF146 (1990) (authorizing member nations to use "all necessary
means" to end Iraqi occupation of Kuwait). And, the permission of the Security Council is,
of course, by no means necessary for American military action. See, e.g., Simon Freeman,
Nightmare with No End in Sight, SUNDAY HERALD, Mar. 28, 1999, at 12 (noting that the
American-led military action against Yugoslavia relating to Kosovo was not authorized by
the United Nations).
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hampered because, in addition to possessing limited ability to enforce its
edicts, decisions of the Council require nine affirmative votes, and each of
the five permanent members has veto power over all substantive decisions
of the Council.'
3. The Secretary-General
The Secretary-General is the chief administrative officer of the U.N.
116
He is nominated by the Security Council and appointed by the General
Assembly.2 7 As a result, to become Secretary-General, a candidate must
have the support of a majority of U.N. members, as well as nine members
of the Security Council, including all five permanent members."" The
Secretary-General's responsibilities are administrative, not executive.
Thus, he appoints the staff of the Secretariat"' and carries out functions
assigned by the bodies of the U.N., including the General Assembly and
the Security Council,"3 but his substantive role is limited to the power to
"bring to the attention of the Security Council" such matters that he
believes may threaten international peace and security.'
B. International Court of Justice
1. The Constitution of the I.C.J.
The U.N. Charter requires that "[a]ll Members... settle their
international disputes by peaceful means."132 The judicial organ of the
United Nations that is theoretically supposed to ensure this is the
International Court of Justice,"3 which sits at The Hague. 34 The I.C.J.
consists of fifteen judges, each of whom is from a different country. 35 The
125. U.N. CHARTER, art. 27, paras. 2-3.
126. U.N. CHARTER art. 97.
127. Id.
128. Any permanent member of the Security Council can veto a candidate for any reason.
For example, in the past, France let it be known that it would not allow an individual who
does not speak French to become Secretary General. See Africans Lobby To Keep Top UN
Post, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 26, 1996; cf Zainul Ariffin, Time for Us To Launch a Bid for
UN Chiefs Post, NEW STRAITS TIMES, Jan. 6, 1997, at 17 (noting France's anachronistic
contention "that French is perhaps the second most important global language.").
129. U.N. CHARTER, art. 101, para. 1.
130. U.N. CHARTER art. 98.
131. U.N. CHARTER art. 99.
132. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3.
133. U.N. CHARTER art. 92; Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945,
art. 2, 59 Stat. 1055, 3 Bevans 1179 [hereinafter I.C.J. Statute].
134. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 133, art. 22, para. 1.
135. Id. art. 3, para. 1.
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judges serve nine-year terms, with five judges selected every three years."'• 137
A judge may be reelected. A judge may be dismissed only by a
unanimous determination of the other judges that he is no longer fulfilling
the required conditions for service on the I.C.J..
The judges are selected through a complicated multi-step process.
Candidates are nominated by national groups from members of the United
Nations"' (and, in some cases, nations that are not U.N. members but are
parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice1 40). A list of all
nominees is compiled by the Secretary-General, and presented to both the
General Assembly and the Security Council. Each body, acting
independently, then considers and votes on the nominees, "bear[ing] in
mind" that the I.C.J. should contain "representation of the main forms of
civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world.' 42  Those
candidates that receive a majority vote in both the General Assembly and
the Security Council are elected to the I.C.J., 143 except that no more than
one candidate from the same country can be elected. If more than one
national from a single country receives a majority vote in both bodies, only
the eldest is elected. 44 This selection process is a rare instance where, on a
substantive vote, the permanent members of the Security Council do not
have a veto.45
If vacancies remain after the initial votes of the Security Council and
the General Assembly, the bodies vote a second, and, if necessary, a thirdt. 141
time. If one or more vacancies on the I.C.J. remain after the third round
of voting, either the General Assembly or the Security Council may
request that a joint conference, consisting of three members chosen by
each body, be formed.' The joint conference then chooses, by absolute
majority, one name for each remaining vacancy to submit to the General
Assembly and the Security Council for their respective approval.'4 8 If the
members of the joint conference unanimously agree, they can submit the
136. Id. art. 13, para. 1.
137. Id.
138. Id. art. 18, para. 1.
139. Id. art. 5, para. 1.
140. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 133, art. 4, para. 2.
141. Id. art. 7.
142. Id. arts. 8-9.
143. Id. art. 10, para. 1.
144. Id. art. 10, para. 3.
145. Id. art. 10, para. 2.
146. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 133, art. 11.
147. Id. art. 12, para. 1.
14& Id.
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name of a person who was not previously nominated by a national group.
On the other hand, if the joint conference determines that it will not be
able to get the General Assembly and the Security Council to agree on a
candidate, the members of the I.C.J. that have been elected shall fill the
remaining vacancies by selecting from among those candidates who
received a majority vote in either the Security Council or the General
Assembly.5 In the event that this vote results in a tie, the eldest judge
shall select between the tied candidates. 5'
2. Enforcement (or Lack Thereof) of I.C.J. Decisions
While the United Nations Charter states that "[ejach Member of the
United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the
International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party,"152 in
reality, I.C.J. rulings are little more than learned suggestions. The I.C.J.
has no means of enforcing its judgments. Where a party ignores an I.C.J.
decision, the opposing party's only recourse is to complain to the Security
Council, which may, "if it deems necessary," make recommendations or
decisions "to give effect to the judgment., 15 3 Thus, any permanent member
of the Security Council can use its veto to prevent any enforcement of an
I.C.J. decision against it or its ally. Moreover, even if the Security Council
were inclined to enforce an I.C.J. judgment, its ability to force nations to
act against their will is extremely limited.
The scope of the I.C.J.'s decisions has an additional limitation. As the
Statute of the I.C.J. makes clear, "[a] decision of the Court has no binding
force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.,
154
As will be seen, even between parties to the case, the "binding force" is
often ephemeral.
3. I.C.J. Cases
a. United States of America v. Iran
A case study in the impotence of the International Court of Justice is
the litigation between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran
over American hostages held in Iran. In January 1979, Shah Reza Pahlavi,
who had ruled Iran with one short interruption since 1941 and had been a
strong U.S. ally since the U.S. aided a 1953 counter-coup that returned the
149. Id. art. 12, para. 2.
150. Id. art. 12, para. 3.
151. Id. art. 12, para. 4.
152. U.N. CHARTER, art. 94, para. 1.
153. U.N. CHARTER art. 94, para. 2.
154. U.N. CHARTER art. 59.
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Shah to power after a week in exile, was overthrown in a revolution led by
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.'55 On November 4, 1979, after months of
Khomeini's anti-American rhetoric, the American Embassy in Tehran was
seized and American hostages were taken by Khomeini's followers.I"
On November 29, 1979, the United States filed suit against Iran
before the I.C.J."57 The United States contended that Iran had violated
various international legal obligations by "tolerating, encouraging, and
failing to prevent and punish" the seizure of the U.S. Embassy and the
detention of its staff."' Iran argued that the I.C.J. could not and should
not adjudicate the U.S. claim regarding the hostages because "this
question only represents a marginal and secondary aspect of an overall
problem, one such that it cannot be studied separately, and which involves,
inter alia, more than 25 years of continual interference by the United
States in the internal affairs of Iran."'159
On December 15, 1979, the I.C.J. issued a provisional ruling, rejecting
Iran's contention that the holding of hostages was "marginal [or]
secondary,"'60 and unanimously ordering that Iran 1) immediately ensure
that the embassy be returned to the United States; and 2) ensure the
immediate release of all U.S. nationals held as hostages.16' Iran simply
disregarded the order.162 Indeed, Iran did not even participate further in
the case."' On May 24, 1980, the I.C.J. issued its final opinion, again
unanimously ordering Iran to release the American hostages.
164
Furthermore, by a vote of twelve to three, the I.C.J. ruled that Iran had an
obligation to pay reparations to the United States for damages suffered as
a result of the hostage-taking and subsequent events.1'5 Once again,
however, Iran simply ignored the ruling.166
155. ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS FOR POLITICAL ENDS 540-44 (Matthew
Bender 2d ed. 1983) (1977).
156. Id. at 544.
157. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v.
Iran), 1979 I.C.J. 7 (Dec. 15) [hereinafter Iran I].
158. Id. at 8.
159. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
160. Id. at 15.
161. Id. at 21.
162. BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 96 (Little, Brown
and Company 2d ed. 1995) (1991).
163. Id. at 100-01.
164. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v.
Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 44-45 (May 24) [hereinafter Iran II].
165. Id. at 45.
166. See CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 162, at 101.
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
The I.C.J. proved to be ineffectual in remedying the international law
violation that it found. The U.N. Security Council, too, was unable to free
the hostages, despite its unanimous resolution calling for their release.'67
On January 20, 1981, after 444 days of captivity, the hostages were
finally released as a result of negotiations between the United States and
Iran mediated by Algeria& This release occurred more than a year after
the I.C.J.'s first order to Iran.
b. Nicaragua v. United States of America
Although the United States was frustrated by the I.C.J.'s inability to
enforce its decision against Iran, the U.S. gained advantage from the
I.C.J.'s impotence in later litigation brought by Nicaragua. On April 9,
1984, the Republic of Nicaragua filed a case in the I.C.J. against the United
States, alleging violations of customary international law and several
treaties.169 Since approximately 1981, the United States, as part of its Cold
War against Communism, had actively opposed Nicaragua's Communist
government, which had taken power from a pro-U.S. government in a
coup. The U.S. supported the anti-Communist Contra rebels, laid mines in
waters near Nicaragua, and flew military flights through Nicaraguan
• 170
airspace.
On May 10, 1984, the I.C.J. issued an opinion ordering provisional
relief pending judgment on the merits. The court ordered that the U.S.
"immediately cease" actions that impeded access to Nicaraguan ports
167. SCOR Res. 457, U.N. SCOR, lth Sess., 2178d mtg. at 24, U.N. Doc. S/RES/457
(1979).
168. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 162, at 101.
169. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 169 (May 10) [hereinafter Nicaragua I].
170. Nicaragua's complaint to the I.C.J. stated:
-The United States is presently engaged in the use of force and the threat
of force against Nicaragua through the instrumentality of a mercenary
army of more than 10,000 men, recruited, paid, equipped, supplied,
trained and directed by the United States, and by means of the direct
action of personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S.
armed forces. The United States has publicly accepted responsibility for
these activities.
-These activities have already resulted in the deaths of more than 1,400
Nicaraguans, military and civilian, serious injury to more than 1,700
others, and $200,000,000 in direct damage to property.
-The object of these activities, as admitted by the President of the United
States, senior U.S. officials and members of Congress, is to overthrow or
at least destabilize the Government of Nicaragua.
Id. at 180-81.
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(such as laying mines), and to refrain from "military and paramilitary
activities" that contravened "principles of international law," such as the
principle that a state may not use "the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or the political independence of any [other] State. 17'
The United States did not dispute its support for the Contras or its
opposition to Nicaragua's Communist government, although it did not
admit to the specifics of Nicaragua's allegations. 112  Rather, the U.S.
justified its actions as collective self-defense, noting that its Nicaragua
policy was only "one facet of a complex of interrelated political, social,
economic and security matters that confront the Central American
region," which included Nicaragua's own military activities against the
government of El Salvador.' The U.S. also contended that the I.C.J.
lacked jurisdiction over Nicaragua's claims.
The I.C.J., after rejecting El Salvador's attempt to intervene,174
determined that it had jurisdiction over Nicaragua's claims that the U.S.
actions violated customary international law and the Treaty of
Friendship"' between the U.S. and Nicaragua.1 This decision led the
United States to boycott further proceedings in the case. 7 7 Proceeding
without U.S. participation, the I.C.J. rendered a sweeping opinion in favor
of Nicaragua. 78 By majorities ranging from twelve to fourteen judges, the
fifteen-member court ruled that the U.S. had violated both customary
international law and the Treaty of Friendship by, among other things,
supporting the Contras, directing or authorizing flights over Nicaragua,
171. Id. at 187.
172. Id. at 182.
173. Id. at 183; "[T]he United States placed on record such charges made not only by the
United States, but by the Governments of Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras." Id. at
191 (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
174. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 215 (Oct. 4) [hereinafter Nicaragua II].
175. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1956, U.S.-Nicar., 9 U.S.T.
449.
176. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 .C.J. 392 (Nov. 26) [hereinafter Nicaragua III]. The court
determined that it did not have jurisdiction over Nicaragua's claims pursuant to multilateral
treaties. Id.
177. See Statement of the United States Dep't of State (Jan. 18, 1985) ("The Court's
decision of November 26, 1984, finding that it had jurisdiction, is contrary to law and fact.
With great reluctance, the United States has decided not to participate in further
proceedings in this case.").
178. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua IV].
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and laying mines in Nicaraguan waters 9  Moreover, the I.C.J. held that
the U.S. had an obligation "immediately to cease" these activities, as well
as "an obligation to make reparation to the Republic of Nicaragua for all
injury caused to Nicaragua" by these ... .80
Despite this sharp, clear ruling, the I.C.J. could not achieve the
desired results from the U.S. Instead, the United States terminated its
acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction before the I.C.J., and decided not
to alter its policy towards Nicaragua. 182 Moreover, the United States never
paid any damages to Nicaragua. The U.S. continued its opposition to the
Nicaraguan Communists until Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega was
defeated by U.S. backed Violeta Barrios de Chamarro in February 1990.1"
In September 1991, the I.C.J. removed the case from its docket after the
new Nicaraguan government renounced all of its rights based on the
case.8 Once again, the I.C.J. had been decisive but entirely ineffectual.
III. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
The examples of the EU and I.C.J. might reasonably lead one to
question whether an international organization's dispute resolution
process can effectively resolve disputes involving sovereign nations
without severely damaging that sovereignty. The recently established
WTO dispute resolution system, however, meets this standard - to a large
extent.
The World Trade Organization was formed in large part to further the
goals of "raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large
and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and
expanding the production of and trade in goods and services." 5 The more
than 140 WTO members have agreed to abide by certain international
trade agreements covering goods, services, and intellectual property
179. Id. at 146-48.
180. Id. at 149.
181. See Letter from U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz to the U.N. Secretary General
(Oct. 7, 1985) ("[T]he declaration of my Government of 26 August 1946... concerning the
acceptance by the United States of America of the compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice... is hereby terminated.").
182. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 162, at 329 (noting that in the wake of the I.C.J.




185. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, pmbl., Apr.
15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33
J.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
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rights.' 86  Many members also adhere to so-called "plurilateral" trade
agreements relating to civil aircraft, government procurement, dairy, and
"bovine meat.' 87
A. The Political Institutions of the WTO
The principal political institutions of the WTO are the Ministerial
Conference, the General Council, and the Director-General.' 18  The
Ministerial Conference brings together, at least once every two years, high
level trade representatives.8 9 The Ministerial Conference has the power
"to take decisions on all matters" pursuant to the various trade agreements
that bind the WTO members!"
Between meetings of the Ministerial Conference, the functions of the
WTO are conducted by the General Council, which also consists of one
representative from each member nation.' 9' In addition to wielding these
administrative powers, the General Council also doubles both as the
Dispute Settlement Body (the titular head of the WTO's judicial
functions) and as the Trade Policy Review Body.' 92
The Ministerial Conference appoints the Director-General of the
WTO, and is empowered to adopt regulations governing his powers,
duties, conditions of service, and length of term in office. 93
B. The WTO Dispute Resolution Process
The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), an alter ego of the General
Council, is nominally in charge of the WTO's dispute resolution
functions, but, in actuality, it plays a very limited role in the dispute
resolution process.
186. WTO Agreement Annex 1A-IC.
187. WTO Agreement Annex 4.
188. WTO Agreement art. IV; WTO Agreement art. VI.
189. WTO Agreement art. IV, para. 1.
190. Id.
191. WTO Agreement art. IV, para. 2.
192. WTO Agreement art. IV, paras. 3-4. The WTO also has a Council for Trade in
Goods, a Council for Trade in Services, a Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, a Committee on Trade and Development, a Committee on Balance-of-
Payments Restrictions, and a Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration. WTO
Agreement art. IV, paras. 5, 7. Membership on each of these councils and committees is
open to representatives of all WTO members. Id.
193. WTO Agreement art. VI, para. 1-2.
194. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, art. 2, para. 1, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND VOL. 1
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The complicated WTO dispute resolution process begins with a
mandatory "consultations" phase.9 A WTO member that believes that
another member is violating a WTO trade agreement requests that
member to enter consultations aimed at reaching a settlement of the
dispute.96  If the respondent party refuses consultations or if the
consultations fail to settle the dispute, the complaining party may request
that a dispute resolution panel be convened.""
When a dispute reaches the (first) litigation stage, a panel is
established to try the dispute. While the panel is nominally appointed by
the DSB,' 98 in fact, panels are appointed by the Secretariat.199 The
Secretariat initially proposes nominations for the three-member 20 panel
from a list of candidates maintained by the Secretariat.2°' Panelists may be
government officials or private citizens, and may be former WTO
representatives or Secretariat employees."' The parties to the dispute may
oppose the nominees for "compelling reasons" only, although that term is
not defined in the treaty. If the parties do not agree to the Secretariat's
nominees within twenty days, the Director-General appoints the panel,
after consulting with the Chairmen of the DSB and of the relevant council
204
or committee.
This panel, appointed specifically for the dispute at hand, serves as the
trier of fact and (in the first instance) of law. The panel, after receivingS206
submissions from the parties, as well as other information it deems20720
necessary, hands down its decision in the form of a panel report.208 The
panel report is then adopted by the DSB in what is essentially a pro forma
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter Disputes Procedures] ("The Dispute Settlement
Body is hereby established to administer these rules and procedures ... .
195. Disputes Procedures art. 4.
196. Disputes Procedures art. 4, para. 3.
197. Disputes Procedures art. 4, paras. 3, 7.
198. Disputes Procedures art. 6, para. 1.
199. Disputes Procedures art. 8, paras. 6-7.
200. Disputes Procedures art. 8, para. 5 (the panel can consist of five members if the
parties to the dispute agree).
201. Disputes Procedures art. 8, paras. 4, 6.
202. Disputes Procedures art. 8, para. 1.
203. Disputes Procedures art. 8, para. 6.
204. Disputes Procedures art. 8, para. 7.
205. Disputes Procedures art. 11.
206. Disputes Procedures art. 12, para. 6.
207. Disputes Procedures art. 13.
208. Disputes Procedures art. 15, para. 3.
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exercise. 29 At this point, the losing party can either acquiesce to the
decision, or appeal to the WTO's standing Appellate Body."O
The Appellate Body consists of seven individuals who are appointed,
by the DSB, for four-year terms.21' Each member must be unaffiliated with
any government, and each may be reappointed only once. Only three of
the seven members serve on a single appeal, with the makeup of a given
appellate panel determined by rotation.213 The appellate panel reviews the
panel report, but its review is limited to "issues of law" and "legal
interpretations., 214 Thus, the appellate panel must take the initial panel's
factual findings as given.215
While the DSB and its panels can "clarify the existing provisions" of
trade agreements, they cannot "add to or diminish the rights and
obligations provided in the covered agreements." '216 As such, WTO panels
lack the powers of common law courts to shape and create new law or
interpret a "living constitution., 217 The panels are not empowered to seek
amorphous ideals such as justice; rather, they are to provide "security and
predictability."
218
The Appellate Body is not so much a single court as it is a system of
rotating panels, as only three of the seven members serve on any given
dispute. Moreover, the membership of the Appellate Body itself changes
every two years, with members serving only four-year terms, subject to a
maximum tenure of eight years.
209. Disputes Procedures art. 16, para. 4 (the DSB must adopt the panel report unless it
reaches a consensus not to). A consensus cannot be reached, however, if even a single
member objects. Disputes Procedures art. 2, para. 4 n.1. The party prevailing in the panel
report can force the DSB to adopt the report (by blocking any consensus to reject it); and,
"therefore, adoption is virtually automatic." John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding-Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligations, 91 AM. J. INT'L L.
60, 62 n.10 (1997).
210. Disputes Procedures art. 17, para. 1.
211. Disputes Procedures art. 17, paras. 1-2.
212. Disputes Procedures art. 17, paras. 2-3.
213. Disputes Procedures art. 17, para. 1.
214. Disputes Procedures art. 17, para. 6.
215. Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard Of Review,
and Deference To National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 193, 195 (1996) (distinguishing
between questions of law and questions of fact can pose a "difficult question;" one on which
the WTO Agreement offers little guidance).
216. Dispute Procedures art. 3, para. 2.
217. See, e.g., William Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REV.
693 (1976).
218. Disputes Procedures art. 3, para. 2.
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The current WTO dispute resolution procedure is a relatively recent
innovation. Prior to 1995, when the results of the Uruguay Round of
negotiations took effect, the DSB's predecessor, the GATT Council, could
adopt a panel decision only by consensus. As a result, any single member
had a de facto veto over any decision. Thus, much like the U.N.'s
International Court of Justice, the former dispute resolution process had
no teeth.
1. The Banana Dispute - Before the Teeth
A prime example of the I.C.J.-like character of the earlier system is
the long-running banana dispute between the EU and several Western
Hemisphere countries including the United States. In 1993, the EU
implemented a regime for the importation, distribution, and sale of
bananas that favored bananas from certain countries, principally in Africa
and the Caribbean, over bananas from other countries, principally in Latinm •219
America. Not surprisingly, bananas from the favored countries were
overwhelmingly imported by European firms while Latin American
bananas were overwhelmingly imported by American firms.2 O
In May 1993, a panel of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) - the predecessor to the WTO - found that the EU banana
regime violated the EU's treaty obligations. Notwithstanding the panel's
finding, it was never adopted by the GATT Council because the EU
22
simply blocked its adoption.
On July 1, 1993, the EU unilaterally implemented a slightly revised
223banana regime known as Regulation 404. On January 18, 1994, a GATT
Panel found that Regulation 404 also violated the EU's treaty
224obligations. On February 7, 1994 the EU once again exercised its veto
219. Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S. Trade
Representative Announces the Lifting of Sanctions on European Products as EU Opens
Market to U.S. Banana Distributors (July 1, 2001) [hereinafter U.S. Trade Press Release].
220. See Geoff Winestock, U.S. Says Initiative Doesn't Go Far Enough, WALL ST. J. EUR.,
Nov. 11, 1999, at 2.
221. GATT Panel Rules EC's Banana Quotas Violate Trade Rules, WALL ST. J. EUR.,
May 28, 1993, at 7.
222. See Stephanie Nebehay, Disputes Break Out in GATT Pact's Wake, ORANGE
COUNTY REG., Dec. 18, 1993, at D04.
223. EU/Latin America: Commissioner Withdraws Offer on Banana Imports, EUR. REP.,
Feb. 12, 1994, available at 1994 WL 2104517.
224. Banana Split, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 1994, at 6.
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power to prevent the panel's report from being adopted by the GATT
Council. z2'
Thus, the WTO dispute process, much like the I.C.J. in cases
described above, was unable to implement its decision.
2. The Banana Dispute - the WTO with the Teeth
In the February 1996, after the new dispute resolution procedures had
been implemented, the United States, Guatemala, Honduras, Ecuador,
and Mexico began a new round of dispute resolution by requesting
consultations with the EU. 22  Two months later, after two days of
consultations failed to settle the dispute, the five complaining countries
221
requested the establishment of a panel to hear the dispute. On June 7,
1996, the DSB Chairman appointed a panel.228 On May 27, 1997, nearly a
year later, the panel issued four reports (one each for the United States,
Mexico, and Ecuador, and one for Guatemala and Honduras), each
concluding that the EU's banana regime was inconsistent with numerous
229
treaty obligations. The panel recommended "that the Dispute
Settlement Body request the European Communities to bring its import
regime for bananas into conformity with its obligations under [the
treaties]. 230 n 231
The EU promptly appealed to the Appellate Body. In September
1997, in an extensive report addressing numerous legal issues, a three-
member panel of the Appellate Body affirmed most of the initial panel's
rulings, and held that the EU's banana regime violated its treaty
225. EU/Latin America: Steichen Confirms EU Will Reject GATT Banana Panel Ruling,
EUR. REP., Feb. 26, 1994, available at 1994 WL 2104197.
226. Dispute Settlement Body Report, European Communities - Rggime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas: Request for Consultations by Ecuador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and the United States, WT/DS21/1 (Feb. 12, 1996), available
at http://www.wto.org.
227. Dispute Settlement Body Report, European Communities - Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas: Request for the Establishment of a Panel,
WT/DS21/6 (Apr. 12, 1996), available at http://www.wto.org ("Consultations were held
pursuant to the request on 14 and 15 of March, but failed to settle the dispute.").
228. Dispute Settlement Body Report, European Communities - Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas: Constitution of the Panel Established at the
Request of Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and the United States: Communication
by the DSB Chairman, WT/DS27/7 (June 7, 1996), available at http://www.wto.org.
229. Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/ABIR, at 2-3 (Sept. 9, 1997), available at
http://www.wto.org.
230. Id. at 3.
231. Id.
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obligations. 2 With the EU no longer holding veto power in the DSB, the
panel and appellate reports were adopted by the DSB less than two and a
half weeks later. 3
In mid-October 1997, the EU announced that it needed "a reasonable
time [to] comply with its international obligations." ' 3 However, the five
complaining countries were unable to induce the EU to state how much
time the EU deemed "reasonable., 231 On November 5, 1997, the five filed
a request for arbitration on the issue of the EU's implementation of the
WTO ruling."
The parties could not even agree on an arbitrator, and, on December
8, 1997, the Director-General appointed one.237 The EU requested that the
arbitrator give it until at least January 1, 1999, or a total of more than
fifteen months from the WTO's adoption of the ruling, to implement the
ruling.2" The EU noted that, in addition to the need to balance various
treaty obligations, the EU's legislative procedure would take time:
[T]he amendment of [the EU's] banana import regime will require
setting in motion a complex legislative procedure involving: the
European Commission, which has to submit a proposal for the
necessary changes; the European Parliament, which will need to give its
opinion on the proposed changes; and the Council of the European
Union, which will decide on the changes, either by qualified majority or
by unanimity, depending on whether or not it follows the proposal of
the Commission.... [O]nce the amended basic legislation is adopted by
232. Id. at 106.
233. Bananas: EU Agrees To Abide by WTO Ruling, EUR. REP., Sept. 27, 1997, available
at 1997 WL 13046916.
234. Dispute Settlement Body Report, European Communities-Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas: Surveillance Of Implemenation of
Recommendations and Rulings: Request for Arbitration by Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Mexico and the United States, WT/DS27/13 (Nov. 20, 1997), available at http://www.wto.org
[hereinafter Request for Arbitration] ("On 16 October 1997, the EC announced to the DSB
that it would require a 'reasonable period of time' in order to 'comply with its international
obligations."'); see also Dispute Settlement Body Report, European Communities - Regime
for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Award of the Arbitrator,
WT/DS27/15 (Jan. 7, 1998), available at http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Award of
Arbitrators] (On October 16, 1997, "the European Communities state that - while
intending to act expeditiously - it would in view of the complexity of the matter at issue,
require a reasonable period of time in which to examine all the options to meet its
international obligations.").
235. See Request for Arbitration, supra note 234.
236. Id.
237. Award of Arbitrators, supra note 234, para. 3.
238. Id. para. 5.
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the Council, the European Commission will still need to adopt
implementing legislation to make the new import regime operational.
[Moreover,] under [the EU's] administrative practice, any change in
legislation which directly affects the customs treatment of products in
connection with importation or exportation, enters into force either 1
219January or I July of the relevant year.
Although the five complaining nations vigorously disagreed with the
EU's proposed timetable,40 the arbitrator accepted the EU's proposal,
241giving it until January 1, 1999 to bring its import regime into compliance.
Over the next few months, the EU began constructing an alternative
142banana import regime. However, the newly proposed plan did not
abolish the distinction between African and Caribbean countries on the
one hand and Latin American countries on the other - the very distinction
that had caused the dispute in the first place. 43 Thus, on August 18, 1998,
the five complaining countries started a new round of dispute resolution by
requesting consultations with the EU.244 The five countries noted that
consultations would be fruitless, but acknowledged their obligation to
request consultations before requesting a dispute resolution panel: "[I]t is
with further regret that we find ourselves writing to you to request
unnecessary, hollow procedural steps that will needlessly consume the time
and resources of all the parties. ' 245 Ecuador and the United States, not
satisfied with such "hollow procedural steps," later announced that they
would seek to impose trade sanctions against the EU.'46 After a great deal
239. Id. paras. 7, 9.
240. Id. paras. 13-17.
241. Id. para. 20.
242. Dispute Resolution Body, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas: Status Report by the European Communities, WT/DS27/17
(July 13, 1998), available at http://www.wto.org.
243. Dispute Settlement Body Report, European Communities-Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas: Joint Statement by Ecuador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Mexico, Panama and the United States, WT/DSBICOM/4 (Mar. 31, 1998),
available at http://www.wto.org.
244. Dispute Settlement Body Report, European Communities-Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas: Request for Consultations by Ecuador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and the United States, WT/DS27/18 (Aug. 31, 1998),
available at http://www.wto.org.
245. Id.
246. See Dispute Settlement Body Report, European Communities-Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas: Request for the Establishment of a Panel by
the European Communities, WT/DS27/40 (Dec. 15, 1998), available at http://www.wto.org.
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of procedural wrangling, the proposed sanctions came before the original
panel, which ruled in April 1999 that the United States could suspend
247
trade concessions worth up to $191.4 million per year.
That very month, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
announced that, pursuant to the WTO's decision permitting trade
sanctions, the United States would impose 100% tariffs on nine EU
products to retaliate for the EU's failure to bring its banana import regime
into compliance with its treaty obligations.2 4 These retaliatory tariffs
remained in effect for two years until after the U.S. and EU reached a
mutually acceptable solution.2 4 9  Under the agreed-upon plan, the EU
adopted a new system of banana licensing on July 1, 2001. By January 1,
2002, the EU was required to shift additional quota to Latin American
bananas,"' and, by January 1, 2006, the EU must end banana quotas
altogether.25'
The banana dispute is perhaps the most high-profile dispute to be
settled through the WTO dispute resolution process, but it is by no means
the only such success. For example, the WTO dispute resolution process
has facilitated mutually agreed settlements relating to Belgian rice
imports,2 3 Philippine regulations in the motor vehicles sector,24 and U.S.
trademark provisions.25 '
3. Lessons from the Banana Cases
Perhaps the most obvious lesson from the eight-year battle over
bananas is that the pre-1995 dispute resolution process was ineffective in
247. Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities-Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas-Recourse to Arbitration by European Communities Under
Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS27/ARB (Apr. 9, 1999), available at http://www.wto.org.
248. U.S. Trade Press Release, supra note 219 (noting that the U.S. had announced 100%
tariffs on bath preparations, handbags, wallets, felt paper and paperboard, paper and





253. See Dispute Settlement Body, Case on Belgium-Administration of Measures
Establishing custom Duties for Rice, WT/DS210 (Dec. 18, 2001), available at
http://www.wto.org.
254. See Dispute Settlement Body, Case on Philippines-Measures Affecting Trade and
Investment in the Motor Vehicle Sector, WT/DS195 (Dec. 18, 2001), available at
http://www.wto.org.
255. See Dispute Settlement Body, Case on United States-Section 211 Omnibus
Appropriations Act of 1998, WT/DS176 (Sept. 20, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org
(U.S. intent to comply with WTO ruling communicated Feb. 1, 2002).
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enforcing international law. Obviously, if any single member can
effectively veto any dispute resolution decision, then no member need
accept any decision that it does not want to accept.
But the more relevant lessons are from the post-1995 portion of the
dispute. The WTO dispute resolution process could certainly be called
inefficient - it took years to reach a resolution, and arguably the EU will
not truly be in compliance with its treaty obligations until 2006. However,
the process was effective in pushing the EU to honor its international
obligations. Moreover, it did so as a true international dispute resolution
process, respecting the sovereignty of the individual WTO members. As
one commentator has noted, "[t]he genius of the GATTIWTO system is
the flexibility with which it accommodates the national exercise of
sovereignty, yet promotes compliance with its trade rules through
incentives.""'
The WTO dispute resolution process ensures respect for sovereignty
through a variety of measures. First, the WTO panels are limited to
interpretation of the treaties. They are explicitly forbidden from
increasing or diminishing the rights and obligations in the written
documents.2 7 Thus, unlike the ECJ, the WTO panels cannot broaden the
scope of their power by looking to customary international or domestic law
or to ideals and policies that underlie the treaties or the WTO.
Second, the panels and the DSB lack the ability to directly coerce
WTO members into obeying an order or judgment. Unlike the ECJ, the
WTO panels cannot directly strike down or enact law in a member
country. Nor can they order a member to pay money or to act in any other258
way. Rather, the WTO dispute resolution identifies treaty
noncompliance, measures the cost of the noncompliance to the
complaining member, and authorizes the complaining member to take
proportionate action against the violator. Rather than acting as a super-
sovereign, the WTO dispute resolution process channels the pre-existing
power of the complaining member in a way that pushes the violator toward
compliance with its obligations, while avoiding a full-scale trade war that
would threaten the international trading system. In the absence of the
WTO, a complaining party's retaliatory tariffs (which would be based only
256. Jackson, supra note 209, at 61.
257. See Dispute Procedures art. 3, para. 2.
258. See Jackson, supra, note 209, at 61 ("When a panel established under the WTO
Dispute Settlement System Understanding issues a ruling adverse to a member, there is no
prospect of incarceration, injunctive relief, damages for harm inflicted or police
enforcement. The WTO has no jailhouse, no bail bondsmen, no blue helmets, no
truncheons or tear gas.").
2002]
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on that country's unilateral view of what was "fair") would likely provoke
further trade sanctions leading to a breakdown in international trade.21'
Additionally, unlike the ECJ, the WTO dispute resolution mechanism
only deals with disputes between WTO members; it does not hear cases
brought by individuals. The WTO is not a judge of the propriety of the
way a nation governs individuals. It is merely an arbitrator of disputes
regarding the performance of explicit treaty obligations.
Another feature that assists in keeping the panels within their proper
scope is the way in which panels are constituted. The initial panel is
created solely for the given dispute. And, the appellate panel consists of
three members of the standing seven-member Appellate Body, chosen by
rotation. Moreover, the members of the Appellate Body serve only four-
year terms with a two term maximum, in contrast to ECJ judges, who can
serve an unlimited number of six-year terms, or U.S. judges who serve for
life. Thus, in the WTO, there are a series of ever-changing arbitrating
bodies, rather than a single standing court that might be tempted (as
standing courts tend to be) to amass power for itself.
IV. CONCLUSION
The United Nations, the EU, and the World Trade Organization,
perhaps the world's three most prominent international organizations,
present three different models of judicial dispute resolution. The
important lesson that should be gleaned from a comparison of these three
models is that while an international "court" can be a threat to national
sovereignty, it need not be. International dispute resolution can, when
designed properly, respect the sovereignty of nation-states, while still
serving as an effective arbiter of international disputes. Thus, while
nations that value independence and national sovereignty should be
vigilant in entering into agreements that submit themselves to
international dispute resolution processes, nations should not fear that
every effective international organization necessarily presents the specter
of "new world government."
259. See Calming the Steel Spat, WASH. POST, May 1, 2002, at A24 ("In threatening to
retaliate [against recently imposed U.S. steel tarrifs with trade sanctions on a variety of
industries] without first seeking the blessing of a World Trade Organization tribunal, the
EU is jeopardizing the multilateral [trade] system.").
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